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PRECEDENTIAL VALUE OF DECISIONS OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
TAYLOR MATTIS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Whenever a judicial system employs a three-tiered judicial structure
with trial courts, an intermediate appellate court or courts, and a high
court, the issue arises of what precedential value shall be accorded to
decisions of the intermediate court or courts. New Mexico has had a
three-tiered structure since 1965.
Precedent, or stare decisis, can operate in two different directions:
horizontally, meaning that a panel of the court of appeals is bound by
a prior decision of the court of appeals, even though rendered by a
different panel of judges; and vertically, meaning that trial courts are
bound by a decision of the court of appeals.' Of course, modern stare
decisis does not mean that a point of law once decided is settled for all
time. 2 It does mean that an apt decision will be followed, distinguished,
or overruled by the deciding court, as well as followed by lower courts
in the same judicial system. If the deciding court neither follows nor
overrules its own "on point" decision, it creates a conflict within the
jurisdiction. Conflicts, if allowed to persist, forfeit the benefits of certainty, stability, and predictability of the law which the doctrine of stare
decisis is intended to foster.
The number of states with intermediate appellate courts has increased
greatly within the past fifteen years.' The general trend in jurisdictions
with large intermediate appellate courts may go from recognition of
horizontal stare decisis to ignoring it. That is, for a time after the
intermediate court is established, it will speak in terms of high deference
to its own prior decisions. As time goes on, however, the court departs

* Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University, School of Law; Visiting Professor of Law,
University of Miami, School of Law (1991-93); B.A., University of Alabama; J.D., University of
Miami; LL.M., Yale University. Member of Illinois and Florida Bars.
The author acknowledges with gratitude the valuable comments from Judge Pamela Minzner,
New Mexico Court of Appeals, and the research assistance of Lynn Pickard, then Chief Staff
Attorney, now Judge, of the New Mexico Court of Appeals.
I. See generally Mattis & Yalowitz, Stare Decisis Among [Sic] the Appellate Court of Illinois,
28 DE PAUL L. REV. 571 (1979) (applying these concepts of horizontal and vertical stare decisis to
the intermediate appellate court in Illinois).
2. Stare decisis, if correctly understood, is not static and does not forever prevent the courts
from reversing themselves or from applying principles of common law to new situations as the need
arises. See Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 114 N.W.2d 105, 110 (1962) (citing Douglas, Stare
Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949)).
3. By 1891 there were only seven intermediate state appellate courts. R. STERN, APPELLATE
PRACnCE 6 & n.10 (2d ed. 1989). Now all but eleven states have them. Id. at 7. Fifteen states
created intermediate appellate courts within the past fifteen years. Id. at 6 & n.12.
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from the principle and willy-nilly creates conflicts, proclaiming that it is
not "bound" by a decision of a prior panel, branch, or division of the
court, yet failing to overrule that prior decision. 4 In some jurisdictions,
horizontal stare decisis is eschewed. Nevertheless, all trial courts are said
to be bound by intermediate appellate court decisions; vertical stare decisis
is required.' This kind of jurisprudence may be satisfying to an individual
panel of appellate judges who believe that they have ruled correctly in
the case they decided, 6 yet are unwilling to offend coordinate judges by
overruling their decision. Trial courts, lawyers and other planners of
transactions, however, find themselves in an untenable position where
they are "bound" by conflicting decisions of an intermediate appellate
court. Litigants, to the extent that they understand the situation at all,
may believe that equal protection of the law is mocked.

4. The Florida, Illinois, and Michigan experiences are examples.
Florida: Compare Stanfill v. State, 384 So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. 1980) ("[D]ecisions of the
district courts of appeal represent the law of Florida unless and until they are
overruled by this Court.") with McDonald's Corp. v. Department of Transp.,
535 So. 2d 323, 325-26 (Fla. App. 1988) ("IT]his court is not bound by the
decision of a sister district court.").
Illinois: Compare Hughes v. Mendendorp, 294 Ill. App. 424, 427-28, 13 N.E.2d 1015,
1017 (1938) ("[Ain opinion of the Appellate Court is binding authority ... upon
said court.") with Garcia v. Hynes & Howes Real Estate, Inc., 29 Ill. App. 3d
479, 481, 331 N.E.2d 634, 636 (1975) ("The opinions of any Appellate Court
• . . are ... not [binding] on the other branches of the Appellate Court.").
Michigan: Compare Hackett v. Kress, 1 Mich. App. 6, 11, 133 N.W.2d 221, 223 (1965)
("[A] decision of any division of this Court is controlling state-wide until a
contrary decision is reached by another division on the identical question or
until such decision is reversed by the Supreme Court.") with City of Detroit
v. Recorder's Court Traffic & Ordinance Judge, 104 Mich. App. 214, 228, 304
N.W.2d 829, 835 (1981) ("[Dlecisions of this Court are not precedent setting
in the sense that subsequent panels of this Court are bound to follow earlier
opinions .... ).
The Supreme Court of Michigan has promulgated Administrative Order 19906, entitled "Resolution of Conflicts in Court of Appeals Decisions," effective
November 1, 1990. It provides that a panel of the court of appeals must follow
the rule of law established by a prior published decision of the court of appeals
issued on or after November 1, 1990. For a discussion of the rule see Mattis,
Stare Decisis Within Michigan's Court of Appeals: Precedential Effect of Its
Decisions on the Court Itself and on Michigan Trial Courts, 37 WAYNE L.
REV. 265, 305-11 (1991).
5. See, e.g., Mattis & Yalowitz, supra note 1, at 592; Mattis, supra note 4, at 272, 274.
Compare McGlothlen v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 71 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 1017, 140 Cal.
Rptr. 168, 176 (1977) ("[O]ne division or district [of the court of appeals] may decline to follow
a prior decision of a different district or division.") with Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court,
57 Cal. 2d 450, 455, 20 Cal. Rptr. 321, 324 (1962) ("Decisions of every division of the District
Courts of Appeal are binding upon all the justice and municipal courts and upon all the superior
courts of this state . . . .") (quoted in Hale v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 221, 229 n.3, 539 P.2d
817, 822 n.3, 124 Cal. Rptr. 57, 62 n.3 (1975)) and Brewer v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 609 F. Supp.
1258, 1266 (E.D. Cal. 1985) ("Where decisions of equal authority are in conflict, 'the court exercising
inferior jurisdiction can and must make a choice between the conflicting decisions."').
6. See Schaefer, Foreword: Stare Decisis and the "Law of the Circuit," 28 DE PAUL L. REV.
565, 566 (1979), wherein Justice Schaefer recognizes that judges feel responsible for the moral
rightness of each of their decisions ("[tlhat responsibility is probably felt most deeply by our most
conscientious judges"), but emphasizes that that feeling does not relieve judges from an obligation
to avoid creating conflicts.
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To its credit the New Mexico Court of Appeals has not succumbed
to the temptation of rejecting horizontal stare decisis. It generally acts
and speaks with deference to its own prior decisions, regardless of the
personnel of the bench who happen to be sitting. Further, it seems to
be taken for granted that lower courts in New Mexico are bound by
decisions of the court of appeals. With remarkably few exceptions, the
trial courts and the court of appeals honor the principles of stare decisis,
deferring to prior decisions of the court of appeals, with the result that
there is comparatively
little conflict or inconsistency in the jurisprudence
7
of New Mexico.
This article first sets forth the structural and procedural position of
the court of appeals within the state. It then examines judicial decisions
involving the precedential value of court of appeals decisions. By attending
to the issue while there are few conflicts among court of appeals decisions,
New Mexico may avoid the problems plaguing other jurisdictions where
conflicts abound.
II.

JUDICIAL STRUCTURE

By a 1965 constitutional amendment, New Mexico added a court of
appeals to the list of institutions in which the judicial power of the state
is vested." The court of appeals, as established by the constitution and
the legislature, is unitary; it is not divided into districts, divisions, or
branches. It consists of ten judges.9 The headquarters of the court and
the clerk's office are located at the seat of government, Santa Fe, although
the court may convene at any location in New Mexico.' 0 Three judges

7. To be sure, in any living, growing judicial system the legal and philosophical concepts and
moods of judges will change. Over time, uncertainty, vagueness, and conflicting opinions may result.
See Trujillo v. Baldonado, 95 N.M. 321, 326, 621 P.2d 1133, 1138 (Ct. App. 1980) (Sutin, J.,
specially concurring).
8. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § I:
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in the senate when sitting as a
court of impeachment, a supreme court, a court of appeals, district courts; probate
courts, magistrate courts and such other courts inferior to the district courts as
may be established by law from time to time in any district, county or municipality
of the state.
9. The 1965 constitutional amendment provided that the court of appeals shall consist of not
less than three judges. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 28 (1965, amended 1988). By an amendment to
article VI, section 28, adopted in 1988, the court of appeals consists of not less than seven judges.
Article VI, section 28 of the constitution, before and after the 1988 amendment, further provides
that when necessary, the chief justice of the supreme court may designate any justice of the supreme
court, or any district judge of the state, to act as a judge of the court of appeals. Id.
By statute the court of appeals now comprises ten judges. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-1 (Supp.
1991).
10. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-7 (Repl. Pamp. 1990). For example, in the 1985-86 fiscal year the
court of appeals held eight days of oral arguments involving eleven cases in Santa Fe, Albuquerque,

and Roswell.

ADMINISTRATIVE OFICaE OF THE COURTS, 74TH FISCAL YEAR ANN. REP. OF THE NEw
MExIco JUD. BRANCH OF GOV'T 17 (1986). In the 1986-87 fiscal year the court held eight days of

oral arguments involving thirteen cases in Santa Fe, Albuquerque, and Roswell.
OFFICE OF THE COURTS, 75TH

31 (1987).
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constitute a quorum, and, by statute not more than three judges sit in
any matter on appeal."
The jurisdiction of the court of appeals is broad. The supreme court
specifically reserves to itself direct appeals from the district courts in
cases involving a penalty of death or life imprisonment and those "in
which one or more counts of the complaint alleges a breach of contract
or otherwise sounds in contract. 'I2 Most other appeals are taken to the
court of appeals. 3
Conflict resolution is specifically provided for in that the supreme court
has jurisdiction to review by writ of certiorari to the court of appeals
any matter in which the decision of the court of appeals conflicts with
a decision 14of the supreme court or with another decision of the court
of appeals.

III.

HORIZONTAL STARE DECISIS

Although this author found no specific language to the effect that a
panel of the court of appeals must either follow or overrule a prior court
of appeals decision on a particular point of law, the more important
finding was that the court behaves consistently with that precept. In a
recent memorandum opinion, State v. Bothne,"5 the court of appeals
followed an indistinguishable prior court of appeals decision, chosing not
to revisit it. In a specially concurring opinion Judge Pickard agreed that
the prior case should be followed, even though she had "serious reservations" about the validity of the precedent. She said:
I concur in the above case only because the issue was recently
decided by a panel of this court and I believe that, notwithstanding
my concerns about whether the issue was correctly decided in that
case, it is more important for this court to follow its own recent
precedents than to allow justice to be a gamble in which the rights
of the parties are governed by the draw of a particular panel of
judges. 16

II. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 28; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-11 (Repl. Pamp. 1981); see discussion
infra note 18. The court of appeals does sit in panels. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS,
75TH FISCAL YEAR ANN. REP. OF THE

NEw

MEXICO JUD.

BRANCH OF GOV'T,

p. i (1987).

12. N.M. R. APP. P. 12-102. The supreme court also reserves to itself appeals from the Public
Service Commission, removals from the State Corporation Commission, appeals from the granting
of writs of habeas corpus, and appeals inany other matter in which jurisdiction has been specifically
reserved to the supreme court by the constitution or by supreme court order or rule. Id.
13. Id.; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-8 (Repl. Pamp. 1990) for a legislative statement of
the jurisdiction of the court of appeals. The appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court is residual,
however, extending to all cases where appellate jurisdiction is not specifically vested by law in the
court of appeals. State v. Weddle, 77 N.M. 420, 424, 423 P.2d 611, 614 (1967).
14. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-14(B)(1) to -14(B)(2) (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
15. No. 13,425 (N.M. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1991), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 32, 882 P.2d 671 (1991).
16. Id., slip op. at I (Pickard, J.,specially concurring). Judge Hartz, concurring in the memorandum opinion, responded to Judge Pickard as follows:
A decision of one panel to blindly follow a precedent from another panel does
not eliminate the "gamble in which the rights of the parties are governed by the
draw of a particular panel of judges." The parties in the second appeal are simply
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That no case was found wherein the supreme court was asked to resolve
a conflict between decisions of the court of appeals is strong support
for the conclusion that the court of appeals does indeed apply horizontal
stare decisis. The awareness of the court of the necessity for certainty
7 There were separate
in the law is demonstrated in State v. Tijerina.1
opinions from each of the three judges on the court of appeals panel:
one calling for an affirmance of the criminal conviction, the second
calling for reversal and remand for a new trial, and the third calling for
reversal and remand for discharge of the defendant. In a per curiam
decision the cause was certified to the supreme court as of substantial
public interest that should be determined by the supreme court. The court
of appeals was concerned that the three proposed opinions, if filed as
opinions of the court of appeals, "would create uncertainty in the law
in that although there is a majority for reversal there is no guidance for
the future procedure of the case."' 18
The court of appeals does not hesitate to overrule its own prior decisions
when they are deemed erroneous. 9 This is in accord with the concept
of horizontal stare decisis that a court will refrain from creating conflicting
law within a given jurisdiction.
Only two circumstances have been identified wherein the court of
appeals neither follows nor overrules its own prior decisions. Close ex-

bound by the results of the gamble in the first appeal.
Id., slip op. at 1 (Hartz, J., concurring).
The argument, however, proves too much. By the nature of stare decisis itself parties in later
cases are bound by the fortuitous gamble of which case got decided first, how good were the
lawyers in the first case, how astute were the judges in the first case, etc.
17. 84 N.M. 432, 504 P.2d 642 (Ct. App. 1972), aff'd, 86 N.M. 31, 519 P.2d 127 (1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 956 (1974).
18. Id. at 432, 504 P.2d at 642. The court of appeals believed that it had no power to call in
additional judges because N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-11 (Repl. Pamp. 1990) (formerly § 16-7-11 (Repl.
Pamp. 1970)) provides that "not more than three judges shall sit in any matter on appeal." The
supreme court, however, protective of its superior rule-making power, noted that because it had
not seen fit to modify the operation of the statute by rule, it had no disagreement with the reasoning
of the court of appeals on that matter. State v. Tijerina, 86 N.M. 31, 32, 516 P.2d 127, 128
(1973).
19. See e.g., Varos v. Union Oil Co., 101 N.M. 713, 688 P.2d 31 (Ct. App. 1984), overruling
Purcella v. Navajo Freight Lines, 95 N.M. 306, 621 P.2d 523 (Ct. App. 1980); Candelaria v. Hise
Constr., 98 N.M. 763, 652 P.2d 1214 (Ct. App. 1981), overruled in part, Garcia v. Schneider, Inc.,
105 N.M. 234, 731 P.2d 377 (Ct. App. 1986), overruling Newhoff v. Good Housekeeping, Inc.,
94 N.M. 621, 614 P.2d 33 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 674, 615 P.2d 991 (1980); State v.
Virgil, 86 N.M. 388, 524 P.2d 1004 (Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975), overruling
State v. Nemrod, 85 N.M. 118, 509 P.2d 885 (Ct. App. 1973), overruling State v. Lewis, 80 N.M.
274, 454 P.2d 360 (Ct. App. 1969), on issue of inventory searches.
Indeed, the court of appeals does not hesitate to "overrule" decisions of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on interpretation of New Mexico statutory law. See State
v. Ruud, 90 N.M. 647, 649-50, 567 P.2d 496, 498-99 (Ct. App. 1977); cf. DeVargas v. State ex
rel. New Mexico Dep't of Corrections, 97.N.M. 447, 451, 640 P.2d 1327, 1331 (Ct. App. 1981),
cert. quashed, 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d 166 (1982) (rejecting the reasoning of and refusing to follow
a federal district court on the choice of the appropriate state statute of limitations for section 1983
civil rights actions). The choice of the applicable state statute of limitations was later held to be
a question of federal law. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985). The New Mexico Court of
Appeals thereafter followed the characterization rule of the United States Supreme Court. Walker
v. Maruffi, 105 N.M. 763, 768, 737 P.2d 544, 549 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 105 N.M. 707, 736
P.2d 985 (1987).
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amination will reveal that in neither circumstance is the court deviating

from the principles of stare decisis. One situation occurred where review
of the prior decision was pending in the supreme court when the court
of appeals decided the second case contrary to the prior. This situation
could be viewed as creating a principled exception to the rule of horizontal
stare decisis. The other circumstance is where the prior opinion is not
considered precedent at -all, in that it is a "one-judge" opinion. No
departure from stare decisis is involved, stare decisis simply does not

apply. In this latter circumstance, where the court does not follow the
prior one-judge opinion, the court sometimes plainly labels the portion
not followed as erroneous. This course of action should prevent any
future reliance on the opinion just as effectively as an overruling of prior
precedent would.
A.

Prior Decision Pending Before Supreme Court

In the first situation, State v. Scott, 0 a criminal defendant argued
before the court of appeals that one of the uniform jury instructions
approved by the supreme court was erroneous. He cited a two-month
old court of appeals decision, State v. Castrillo, wherein two judges had
ruled favorably on such a contention. 2' That decision was pending before
the supreme court on a writ of certiorari recently issued. The Scott court
"declined to review the merits" of the jury instruction because it was
"bound by the Supreme Court order approving the challenged instruc-

tions." ' 22 In so doing, the court of appeals was declining to follow a
decision of the court of appeals, but was doing so in the service of
vertical stare decisis. Normally, such action would be accompanied by
overruling the prior court of appeals decision. Because Castrillo was
pending before the supreme court, an overruling by the court of appeals

might have been considered precipitant. 23 This consideration could justify
20. 90 N.M. 256, 561 P.2d 1349 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
overruled on other grounds, State v. Reynolds, 98 N.M. 527,
21. Scott, 90 N.M. at 257, 561 P.2d at 1350.
22. Id.
23. The case that was argued as precedent in Scott, State
by the court of appeals on December 21, 1976. The opinion

90 N.M. 637, 567 P.2d 486 (1977),
650 P.2d 811 (1982).
v. Castrillo, No. 2499, was decided
was not reported. See N.M. STAT.

§ 34-5-13 (Repl. Pamp. 1990) (providing for selection by the court of appeals of the opinions
that shall be published). Writ of certiorari was issued on February 1, 1977. Scott was decided on
March 1, 1977. Scott, 90 N.M. at 256, 561 P.2d at 1349. The supreme court decided State v.
Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 566 P.2d 1146 (1977), overruled, State v. Wardlow, 95 N.M. 585, 624 P.2d
527 (1981), on July 8, 1977.
On the issue of the effect of a grant of certiorari by the supreme court one might compare the
experience of the State of Michigan. Michigan Court Rule 7.215(C)(2) provides: "The filing of an
application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court or a Supreme Court order granting leave to
appeal does not diminish the precedential effect of a published opinion of the Court of Appeals."
Before that rule was enacted, the Supreme Court of Michigan had said that an application for
leave to appeal to it from a decision of the court of appeals effectively stays the court of appeals
decision as a final adjudication and denies it precedential force until the supreme court denies leave
to appeal. People v. Phillips, 416 Mich. 63, 74-75, 330 N.W.2d 366, 371 (1982). Under the Phillips
rule, a federal court applying state law might refuse to follow a court of appeals decision for which
an application for leave to appeal had been filed. See Spurgeon v. Ford Motor Co., 502 F. Supp.
729, 731 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
ANN.
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an exception to the stare decisis requirement that a court either follow
or overrule its own prior decision.
On the other hand, a conflict can be left standing in this situation if
the supreme court does not rule on the issue despite its having granted
certiorari. Consider what did happen after the Scott decision. About four
months later, the supreme court reversed Castrillo on a double jeopardy
issue.2 4 The power of the court of appeals to entertain an argument on
the validity of uniform jury instructions approved by the supreme court
was not addressed in the supreme court's Castrillo opinion.
Because the court of appeals Castrillo decision was unpublished, the
chances for confusion resulting from two conflicting decisions, the earlier
of which was not overruled or reversed on the point at issue, were
minimal. The court of appeals' Castrillo decision was publicized, however,
through the discussion in Scott. Whenever there are two published decisions with opposite results in this jurisdiction, the bench and bar would
likely assume that the earlier decision was impliedly overruled by the
later. Such an assumption would not be likely in jurisdictions that do
not have a tradition of conflict avoidance by their intermediate appellate
court or courts.

25

On the merits, the Scott court was eminently correct under New Mexico
law in declining review of a uniform jury instruction approved by the
supreme court. Already on the books at the time of the Scott decision
was Alexander v. Delgado,26 wherein the supreme court had reminded
the court of appeals of the impropriety of its purporting to overrule a
number of supreme court cases and to abolish an approved jury instruction. Two years after Scott the supreme court held that the court of
appeals correctly refused to review an objection to a uniform jury instruction, "since it is bound to follow the Supreme Court's order requiring
the use of uniform jury instructions and has no authority to alter, modify
of appeals has
or abolish any such instruction. ' 27 Likewise, the court
28
power.
such
no
has
it
that
maintained
consistently

24. State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 566 P.2d 1146 (1977).
25. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text..
26. 84 N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778 (1973).
27. Collins v. Michelbach, 92 N.M. 366, 367, 588 P.2d 1041, 1042 (1979) (citing Scott, 90 N.M.
256, 561 P.2d 1349); accord State v. Chavez, 101 N.M. 136, 139, 679 P.2d 804, 807 (1984) (citing
Scott, 90 N.M. 256, 561 P.2d 1349).
28. See, e.g., State v. Sparks, 102 N.M. 317, 694 P.2d 1382 (Ct. App. 1985); Jones v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., 100 N.M. 268, 669 P.2d 744 (Ct. App. 1983); State v. Doe, 101 N.M. 363,
683 P.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1983); State v. Lopez, 94 N.M. 349, 350, 610 P.2d 753, 754 (Ct. App.),
aff'd, 94 N.M. 341, 610 P.2d 745 (1980); State v. Sheets, 94 N.M. 356, 610 P.2d 760 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 94 N.M. 675, 615 P.2d 992 (1980); State v. Rhea, 93 N.M. 478, 480, 601 P.2d 448,
450 (Ct. App. 1979); State v. King, 90 N.M. 377, 563 P.2d 1170 (Ct. App. 1977), overruled on
other grounds, State v. Reynolds, 98 N.M. 527, 529, 650 P.2d 811, 813 (1982).
An excellent tactic for dealing with a jury instruction that the court of appeals believes is
erroneous but has no power to review is illustrated in State v. Lopez, 94 N.M. 349, 610 P.2d 753
(Ct. App.), aff'd, 94 N.M. 341, 610 P.2d 745 (1980). The court said: "Merely because the Supreme
Court approved an instruction submitted by a committee appointed for the purpose, does not make
it sacrosanct. It becomes infallible only after the Supreme Court opinionates on the validity of the
instruction." Id. at 351, 610 P.2d at 755. The court then "found" that the jury instruction was
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It is clear that the court of appeals decision in State v. Castrillo was
deviate. The point of interest in this discussion is why Scott, which was
inconsistent but correct, did not expressly overrule Castrillo. The answer
submitted is that Castrillo was pending before the supreme court at the
time the court of appeals decided Scott. If this decision not to follow
or overrule is viewed as an exception to the rule of horizontal stare
decisis, it has a rational basis.2 9
B.

Prior Decision with One-Judge Opinion
The other circumstance in which the court of appeals will decide contrary
to a prior opinion without overruling it is where the prior decision is
devoid of precedential value on the point in issue.3 0 This can occur where
two of the three members of the prior panel concurred "in result only,"
or where one concurs and one dissents. Thus is created a one-judge
opinion.
Supreme court language and authority provide the background for the
one-judge opinion doctrine of the court of appeals. In the five-justice3
supreme court, three justices must concur in an opinion in order for the
high court to create precedent. In Crocker v. Johnston,32 the supreme

court was called upon to apply a certain view of contributory negligence
espoused in a supreme court case decided two years earlier. 33 There were
two dissents and one special concurrence in the earlier opinion. The
holding of the case was gleaned from the portion of the opinion and
the specially concurring opinion that were in agreement. The view that

erroneous, but affirmed a conviction based on that instruction because "we have no authority to
declare it so." Id. at 350, 610 P.2d at 754. On certiorari the supreme court held that the jury
instruction was not erroneous. Lopez v. State, 94 N.M. 341, 610 P.2d 745 (1980).
29. As previously noted, see supra text accompanying note 15, the court in State v. Bothne
choose to follow and not to revisit a prior case, State v. Alvarez, 113 N.M. 82, 823 P.2d 324 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 23, 821 P.2d 1060 (1991). At least one of the judges on the Bothne
panel had serious reservations about the correctness of Alvarez, but the supreme court apparently
still had the opportunity to determine whether it would grant certiorari in Alvarez. Unfortunately,
the supreme court denied certiorari in Alvarez on the same day that Bothne was decided. In any
case, that the prior decision was pending before the supreme court was an appropriate reason for
the court of appeals not to overrule it.
30. Chief Justice Marshall gave guidelines for reading opinions for precedential value in Boyle
v. Zacharie, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 348 (1832). Counsel had asked the Court for advice as to the holding
of Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827), whose five opinions cover 116 pages. The
Chief Justice responded that three of the seven justices concurred in the opinion of Mr. Justice
Johnson on the general question of the constitutionality of state insolvency laws. Four of the seven
Justices therefore had agreed on Johnson's opinion. "Whatever principles are established in that
opinion, are to be considered no longer open for controversy, but the settled law of the court."
Boyle, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 348.
31. N.M. CONST. art. VI, section 4 (1978, amended 1988), provided that the supreme court shall
consist of three justices, but section 10 gives the legislature the power to increase the number to
five. N.M. STAT. ANN. section 34-2-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1990) provides for five justices of the supreme
court. The 1988 amendment to article six, section four, provides that the supreme court shall consist
of at least five justices.
32. 43 N.M. 469, 95 P.2d 214 (1939).
33. Pettes v. Jones, 41 N.M. 167, 66 P.2d 967 (1937).
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concurrence "had not the sanction
was not concurred in by the3 special
4
of a majority of the court."
In the supreme court case of Primus v. Clark3 5 (Primus-2), the issue
was whether a prior supreme court decision, Primus-1, 36 was the law of
the case on later appeal to the supreme court. Primus-1 was heard by
five supreme court justices: one concurred in the opinion, three concurred
in the result. The supreme court in Primus-2 observed that the opinion
in Primus-] did not have the concurrence of a majority of the justices,
even though the three remaining justices did concur in the result. "Hence,
opinion and
it is scarcely accurate to choose given passages from that
37
characterize them as reflecting the views of the court."
Since 1960 the supreme court has used panels of three justices to
dispose of cases "other than those of serious public nature, or those
involving serious constitutional questions. "38 In announcing the commencement of this practice, Justice Carmody stated that the opinion of
such a three-judge court, "as written," must be concurred in by the two
other justices on the panel "in order for it to go down; if one of the
judges who is to participate disagrees or wishes to dissent, then the other
two members of the Court are called in and it becomes a five-man
case." 3 9 Without the concurrence of three of the five supreme court
effect on the
justices, a published opinion would have no precedential
4
supreme court itself4 or on the court of appeals .
It was for the court of appeals to adopt a similar rule that stare decisis
is not applicable to its decisions where fewer than two judges concur in
an opinion. This it did in three cases in 1980. In Casias v. Zia Co.,42
which presented a law of the case rather than a stare decisis problem,
two of the three judges on the first court of appeals panel had concurred

34. Crocker, 43 N.M. at 485, 95 P.2d at 224.
35. 58 N.M. 588, 273 P.2d 963 (1954).
36. Primus v. Clark, 48 N.M. 240, 149 P.2d 535 (1944).
37. Primus-2, 58 N.M. at 595, 273 P.2d at 967. The Primus-2 court did, however, give lawof-the-case treatment to the mandate of Primus-], because the justices there were unanimous in
remanding the cause for the trial court to determine a vital issue. The effect of the plaintiff's
abandonment of that issue was the matter before the court in Primus-2.
38. Address by Justice Carmody before the New Mexico State Bar Association, published in
Carmody, The Supreme Court of New Mexico-Observations of a Justice, I N.M. STATE BAR J. 3,
6 (1961) (quoted in Comment, Courts-Number of Justices Concurring in Opinion-Some Dangers
of New Mexico's "Three-Judge Court," 5 NAT. RESOURCES J. 403, 403 (1965)).
39. Id. (emphasis omitted).
40. See Comment, supra note 38, at 405-07. The author of the comment, John N. Urtes, states
that the following quotation accurately describes the New Mexico situation:
[Tihe doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to a case which was heard by only
three of the five judges of a court where, of these three, one judge delivered an
opinion in which one of the other judges concurred but the third judge concurred
in result only.
Id. at 404 n.7 (quoting 14 AM. JUR. Courts § 81 (1938)).
41. Hamel v. Winkworth, 102 N.M. 133, 692 P.2d 58 (Ct. App. 1984). The Hamel court said
that "the fundamental law issue upon which plaintiffs rely from [Gerrard v. Harvey & Newmann
Drilling Co., 59 N.M. 262, 282 P.2d 1105 (1955)] was a one-judge holding. As such, it is not the
holding of our supreme court." Hamel, 102 N.M. at 134, 692 P.2d at 59.
42. 93 N.M. 78, 596 P.2d 521 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 93 N.M. 8, 595 P.2d 1203 (1979).
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"in result," writing separate opinions. 3 After remand, on a second appeal,
the court refused to accord law of the case status to the previous opinion.
The second Casias court" relied on a statute that provides: "Decisions
of the court [of appeals] shall be in writing with the grounds stated,
and the result shall be concurred in by at least two judges. ' 45 The opinion
in the first Casias case, concerning escalating benefits under the workers'
compensation act, "not being concurred in by another judge, her view
concerning escalating benefits was not a decision of the Court of Appeals. '" 46
Silva v. City of Albuquerque,47 another 1980 case, shifted the labeling
and perhaps the rationale somewhat, but likewise made it plain that the
court of appeals is not bound by a one-judge opinion in a prior court
of appeals case. When it was asked to apply a recent case involving
directed verdict procedure," the Silva court said:
Strickland, an opinion with which one judge of this court concurred
in the result and another judge dissented, constitutes a "judgment"
according to Art. VI, § 28 of the New Mexico Constitution,[ 49] and
a "decision" under [N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-11 (1978).50] But it is
not an opinion expressing the views of a majority of this court as
now constituted; and, because one of the participating judges concurred
only in the result reached, we may reasonably conclude that the
rationale of the opinion does not even express the view of a majority
of the panel which considered that case.5'

43. Id. at 83-84, 596 P.2d at 526-27.
44. Casias v. Zia Co., 94 N.M. 723, 616 P.2d 436 (Ct. App. 1980).

45. N.M.

STAT. ANN.

§ 34-5-11 (Repl. Pamp. 1990).

46. Casias, 94 N.M. at 725, 616 P.2d at 438 (emphasis added).
47. 94 N.M. 332, 610 P.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1980).
48. Strickland v. Roosevelt County Rural Elec. Coop., 94 N.M. 459, 612 P.2d 689 (Ct. App.
1980), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1209 (1983), held that a directed verdict in favor of the defendant
on the grounds that the plaintiff's decedent was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law was erroneous under the circumstances of that case. Strickland was decided by the court of
appeals on January 17, 1980. According to Silva, 94 N.M. at 333, 610 P.2d at 220, certiorari was
granted by the New Mexico Supreme Court on February 26, 1980, to review Strickland. Thus,
apparently an alternative reason was available for the Silva court's refusal to follow the Strickland
decision without overruling it. Strickland was pending before the supreme court when the court of
appeals decided Silva on April 1, 1980, thus calling for the exception discussed infra in text
accompanying notes 20-29.
49. "Three judges of the court of appeals shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of
business, and a majority of those participating must concur in any judgment of the court." N.M.
CoNsT. art. VI, § 28 (emphasis added).
50. "Decisions of the court [of appeals] shall be in writing with the grounds stated, and the
result shall be concurred in by at least two judges." See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
51. Silva, 94 N.M. at 333, 610 P.2d at 220. The court went on to distinguish Strickland, holding
that: "Regardless of its precedential value, however, the Strickland rule cannot be applied to
summary judgment procedures." Id.
Short shrift was given to Strickland in a later court of appeals decision. In Sewell v. Wilson,
101 N.M. 486, 684 P.2d 1151 (Ct. App. 1984), the court responded to plaintiff's reliance on
Strickland: "Two judges agreed in that result, one judge dissented. Thus the result went only to
reversal and not the discussion. See [N.M. STAT. ANN.] § 34-5-11 (Repl. Pamp. 1981); Casias v.
Zia Co., 94 N.M. 723, 616 P.2d 436 (Ct. App. 1980). The discussion in Strickland serves no
precedential value and is not considered." Sewell, 101 N.M. at 492, 684 P.2d at 1157.
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Despite Silva's effort to correct the terminology, other opinions have
court case does not constitute a
continued to state that a one-judge
52
decision of the court of appeals.

The final 1980 case illustrates how conflict and confusion can be avoided
while rejecting a one-judge opinion as precedent. In Trujillo v. Baldonado," the plaintiff relied on a quotation from a prior court of appeals
case54 in arguing that the sudden emergency jury instruction should not
have been given by the trial court. The court ruled that the trial court
was correct for two reasons: (1) language in the prior opinion was not
joined in by other members of the panel, and the view of the opinion
writer "was not an opinion of this Court;"" and (2) the language in
issue "is not to be followed because it is an incorrect statement of the
law." '5 6 Labelling non-precedent as "wrong," "incorrect," or "erroneous"
puts it to rest as thoroughly as overruling precedent.
In the later half of the 1980s the court of appeals in several cases
continued to recognize that a one-judge opinion of a court of appeals
decision is not binding precedent. In some cases the court rejected the
rationale or rule espoused in the one-judge opinion. 57 In some cases,
where the court believed that the one-judge opinion correctly stated the
law, it adopted it," thereby creating precedent. Some cases where two

52. Southern Union Exploration Co. v. Wynn Exploration Co., 95 N.M. 594, 598, 624 P.2d
536, 540 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 920 (1982); Gonzales v. Stanke-Brown & Assocs.,
98 N.M. 379, 385, 648 P.2d 1192, 1198 (Ct. App. 1982).
53. 95 N.M. 321, 621 P.2d 1133 (Ct. App. 1980).
54. Williams v. Cobb, 90 N.M. 638, 567 P.2d 487 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569
P.2d 413 (1977).
55. Trujillo, 95 N.M. at 323, 621 P.2d at 1135.
56. Id.
57. Jaynes v. Wal-Mart Store No. 824, 107 N.M. 648, 763 P.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1988). A workers'
compensation claimant relied on Chavez v. Lectrosonics, Inc., 93 N.M 495, 601 P.2d 728 (Ct. App.
1979), wherein one judge concurred "in result" with no written opinion and another judge concurred
specially with a written opinion. After quoting from the opinion the Jaynes court pointed out that
the "opinion was not an opinion of this court .... Nevertheless, claimant urges the court to adopt
[the opinion-writer's] reasoning. We are not inclined to do so." Jaynes, 107 N.M. at 649, 763 P.2d
at 83 (citations omitted). After analyzing the rationale, the court "rejected" it. Id. at 650, 763
P.2d at 84.
Requarth v. Brophy, Ill N.M. 51, 801 P.2d 121 (Ct. App. 1990), pointed out that plaintiff's
reliance on the broad language of an opinion, Harmon v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 95 N.M. 501,
623 P.2d 1015 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 95 N.M. 593, 624 P.2d 535 (1981), "not concurred in by
a majority of the court," was "misplaced." Requarth, Ill N.M. at 55, 801 P.2d at 125.
58. In Chadwick v. Public Service Co., 105 N.M. 272, 731 P.2d 968 (Ct. App. 1986), cert.
denied, 105 N.M. 290, 731 P.2d 1334 (1987), the question was whether an allergic rash, caused by
airborne substances at employer's generating station, was an occupational disease, where the plaintiffemployee was wholly able to do the same work elsewhere. Marable v. Singer Business Machines,
92 N.M. 261, 586 P.2d 1090 (Ct. App. 1978), had defined occupational disease, under the New
Mexico Occupational Disease Disablement Law, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-3-33 (Repl. Pamp. 1991),
as one that results from the occupation, not the workplace. Two judges on the Marable panel
concurred "in result only" but wrote no opinion. Marable was urged as precedent in Chadwick.
The Chadwick court said: "The discussion and rationale underlying the opinion in Marable do not
constitute binding precedent within the meaning of the state constitution, see N.M. CoNsT. art. VI,
§ 28 because two judges concurred only in the result." Chadwick, 105 N.M. at 274, 731 P.2d at
970. (section 28 of the judiciary article of the state constitution provided then, and after the 1988
amendment still provides, that: "Three judges of the court of appeals shall constitute a quorum
for the transaction of business, and a majority of those participating must concur in any judgment
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judges concurred in result only without written opinions have been cited
as authority in later court of appeals and supreme court decisions with
no mention of Casias or the one-judge opinion rule. 9 Some court of
appeals cases have so cited a prior opinion having one concurrence in
result and one dissent.60 Where opinions with no full concurrence have
of the court."). Nevertheless, the Chadwick court concluded that the Marable "opinion contains
... a definition that we should adopt." Chadwick, 105 N.M. at 274, 731 P.2d 970. Consistently
with Marable, the court held that the condition, resulting from the location of the workplace rather
than the occupation itself, was not an occupational disease.
In Salter v. Jameson, 105 N.M. 711, 736 P.2d 989 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 105 N.M. 720,
737 P.2d 79 (1987), the court quoted from Las Luminarias of New Mexico Council of the Blind
v. Isergard, 92 N.M. 297, 587 P.2d 444 (Ct. App. 1978). The Salter court noted that one member
of the panel in Las Luminarias concurred in the result only and a second specially concurred. Once
again, Casias was cited. The Salter court believed, however, that the principles announced by the
judge who wrote the Las Luminarias opinion correctly stated the law and "we adopt them here."
Salter, 105 N.M. at 713, 736 P.2d at 991.
In State v. Barraza, 110 N.M. 45, 791 P.2d 799 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 704, 789
P.2d 1271 (1990), the court cited State v. Marquez, 87 N.M. 57, 529 P.2d 283 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 87 N.M. 47, 529 P.2d 273 (1974), concerning the plain error rule. In a footnote the court
said: "Although Marquez might be considered a one-judge opinion of no precedential value, see
Casias v. Zia Co., 94 N.M. 723, 616 P.2d 436 (Ct. App. 1980), the dissenting and specially concurring
opinions do not appear to dispute the lead opinion's definition of 'plain error.' In any event, we
agree with that definition." Barraza, 110 N.M. at 49 n.2, 791 P.2d at 803 n.2.
59. Harmon v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 95 N.M. 501, 623 P.2d 1015 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
95 N.M. 593, 624 P.2d 535 (1981), had two concurrences "in result" without further opinions.
The court of appeals cited Harmon as authority in Burgi v. Acid Engineering, Inc., 104 N.M. 557,
559, 724 P.2d 765, 767 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 104 N.M. 460, 722 P.2d 1182 (1986); Begay v.
Livingston, 99 N.M. 359, 362, 658 P.2d 434, 437 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 712, 652
P.2d 734 (1982); and Jelso v. World Balloon Corp., 97 N.M. 164, 168, 637 P.2d 846, 850 (Ct.
App. 1981). But cf. Requarth v. Brophy, Ill N.M. 51, 55, 801 P.2d 121, 125 (Ct. App. 1990),
stating that reliance on broad language in Harmon, "not concurred in by a majority of the court,"
was "misplaced."
Gengler v. Phelps, 92 N.M. 465, 589 P.2d 1056 (Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 353,
588 P.2d 554 (1979), was a decision in which two judges concurred "in result only." It was cited
as authority by the supreme court in Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 400, 649 P.2d 462, 468
(1982), and by the court of appeals in Zuniga v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 100 N.M. 414, 417, 671
P.2d 662, 665 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 439, 671 P.2d 1150 (1983); Marchiondo v. New
Mexico State Tribune Co., 98 N.M. 283, 291, 648 P.2d 321, 330 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. quashed,
98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982); and Kurtz v. Independent Publishing Co., 97 N.M. 243, 247,
638 P.2d 1088, 1092 (Ct. App. 1981) (Donnelly, J., specially concurring).
State v. James, 91 N.M. 690, 579 P.2d 1257 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 751, 580 P.2d
972 (1978), likewise had two concurrences "in result" without further opinions. Its "holding" was
limited in State v. Cervantes, 92 N.M. 643, 648, 593 P.2d 478, 483 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92
N.M. 621, 593 P.2d 62 (1979). James was cited as authority by the supreme court in State v.
Snedeker, 99 N.M. 286, 290, 294, 657 P.2d 613, 617, 621 (1982) (cited in opinion and also in
dissent), and in State v. Turkel, 93 N.M. 248, 251, 599 P.2d 1045, 1048 (1979), and by the court
of appeals in State v. Wyrostek, 108 N.M. 140, 142, 767 P.2d 379, 381 (Ct. App. 1988), cert.
denied, 108 N.M. 115, 767 P.2d 354 (1989); State v. Burdex, 100 N.M. 197, 200, 668 P.2d 313,
316 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 192, 668 P.2d 308 (1983); State v. Donaldson, 100 N.M.
11,
115, 666 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 53, 665 P.2d 809 (1983); State
v. Ramirez, 95 N.M. 202, 204, 619 P.2d 1246, 1248 (Ct. App. 1980); and State v. Jones, 96 N.M.
18, 20, 627 P.2d 413, 415 (Ct. App. 1980), rev'd,*96 N.M. 14, 627 P.2d 409 (1981).
60. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Duran, 93 N.M. 489, 601 P.2d 722
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 93 N.M. 683, 604 P.2d 821 (1979), there was one concurrence in result,
with no concurring opinion written, and one dissent. It has been cited as precedent in In re Doe,
100 N.M. 92, 95, 666 P.2d 771, 774 (1983); Benham v. All Seasons Child Care, Inc., 101 N.M.
636, 639, 686 P.2d 978, 981 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 101 N.M. 686, 687 P.2d 743 (1984); Trembath
v. Riggs, 100 N.M. 615, 620, 673 P.2d 1348, 1353 (Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 101 N.M. 11,
677 P.2d 624 (1984), overruled by, Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 105 N.M. 503, 734 P.2d 743
(1987); Bryant v. Gilmer, 97 N.M. 358, 360, 639 P.2d 1212, 1214 (Ct. App. 1982); In re Estate
of Padilla, 97 N.M. 508, 511, 641 P.2d 539, 542 (Ct. App. 1982).
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been cited as authority without further comment, they may be being used
as persuasive authority, much as secondary or out-of-state authority is.
the supreme 'court cites any court
This would surely be the case when
6
of appeals decision as authority. '
The recognition that a one-judge opinion is not binding precedent
implies the converse. If two court of appeals judges agree on an opinion,
the decision creates precedent binding the court of appeals. 62 This acceptance of horizontal stare decisis is regularly exemplified by court of
appeals decisions.
Within the folds of the one-judge opinion doctrine, however, lies a
facile device for avoiding the creation of precedent if such a device were
ever to be sought. If two judges on a panel agree with the result reached
by the opinion writer but wish to avoid its having value as precedent,
or even as the law of the case, they might accomplish this avoidance
merely by adding "in result" to their concurrence. Judges who do not
concur in a published opinion should carefully consider whether they
have an obligation to write at least a short special concurrence specifying
wherein they disagree and why. Not to do so postpones the time for
settling the law, without the benefit of the thinking of those judges who
disagree with the rationale of the opinion.
Moreover, when a second panel rejects a prior opinion because it lacked
a concurrence, it is proper that the rejecting opinion label and explain
the erroneous nature of the prior opinion. This course is preferable to
a flat rejection under the one-judge opinion doctrine, which merely says
"we do not accept the prior opinion because it is not binding precedent."
Stare decisis does not apply where the one-judge. opinion doctrine
operates. Furthermore, an exception to stare decisis exists where a prior
decision of the court of appeals is pending before the supreme court.
Other than in these two circumstances, the court of appeals either follows
its own on-point prior decisions or overrules them, keeping the jurisdiction
relatively conflict-free. The New Mexico Court of Appeals seems solidly,
if not expressly, 63 committed to precepts of horizontal stare decisis.
IV. VERTICAL STARE DECISIS
As to vertical stare decisis, it seems to go without saying that lower
courts are bound by decisions of the court of appeals absent supreme
61. In re Doe, 100 N.M. 92, 95, 666 P.2d 771, 774 (1983); Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M.
394, 400, 649 P.2d 462, 468 (1982); State v. Snedeker, 99 N.M. 286, 290, 294, 657 P.2d 613, 617,
621 (1982) (cited in opinion and also in dissent); and State v. Turkal, 93 N.M. 248, 251, 599 P.2d
1045, 1048 (1979), are examples of supreme court cases citing one-judge court of appeals opinions
as authority.
62. It may seem ironic that the opinion of two judges of the ten-judge, or formerly sevenjudge, court of appeals can bind that court, whereas the opinion of three justices of the five-justice
supreme court is required to bind that court. The explanation lies in the difference in the constitutional
language pertaining to the two courts. The court of appeals has a quorum of three, "and a majority
of those participating must concur in any judgment of the court." N.M. CoNsT. art. VI, § 28
(emphasis added). The supreme court has a quorum of three, but "a majority of the justices . ..
must concur in any judgment of the court." N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (emphasis added).
63. There is an express commitment in an opinion of at least one of the judges of the court
of appeals. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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court authority to the contrary. It has been emphatically held that the
court of appeals is bound by decisions of the supreme court.64 The New
Mexico Supreme Court, in that context, has used language equally applicable to court of appeals decisions in relation to lower tribunals in
the state.
[I]t is not considered good form for a lower court to reverse a superior
one. Such actions are unsettling in the law which we ought to strive
to make certain, and result in a disorderly judicial process. . . . "The
general rule is that a court lower in rank than the court which made
the decision invoked as a precedent cannot deviate therefrom and
decide contrary to that precedent, irrespective of whether
it considers
65
the rule laid down therein as correct or incorrect.
V.

CONCLUSION

As the State of New Mexico continues to grow, it is possible that the
unified court of appeals will grow in the number of judges and in the
complexity of the system. More than ten judges may be elected or
appointed. The constitution now provides that there shall be "not less
than seven judges."
During the time the constitution provided for "not
less than three judges," a statute provided for five judges. 67 The number
was increased in 1978 to seven judges," and, effective in 1991, to ten
judges. 69 Likewise, by statute under the 1988 constitutional amendment,
the legislature could provide for more than ten judges. Moreover, the
chief justice of the supreme court can designate other judges to sit on
the court of appeals.7 0
Complexity in the system could result if the court of appeals became
geographically separated, with panels or branches regularly sitting in
7
different headquarters. A simple statutory change could accomplish this. 1
Even now, the offices of the judges of the court of appeals are no longer
all in Santa Fe. During 1989 and 1990 half of the judges established
offices in different cities, one in Las Cruces, four in Albuquerque. Five

64. Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 718, 507 P.2d 778, 779 (1973); State v. Manzanares,
100 N.M. 621, 622, 674 P.2d 511, 512 (1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1057 (1985); accord State v.
Scott, 90 N.M. 256, 257, 561 P.2d 1349, 1350 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 637, 567 P.2d
486 (1977), overruled on other grounds, State v. Reynolds, 98 N.M. 527, 650 P.2d 811 (1982).
65. Alexander, 84 N.M. at 718, 507 P.2d at 779 (quoting 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 201 (1965)).
66. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 28.
67. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-1 (1978).; cf. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 28 (repealed 1978).
68. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
69. Id. § 34-5-1 (Supp. 1991).
70. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 28. In the 1987-88 fiscal year nine district court judges were, at
the request of the court of appeals, designated by the supreme court to act as judges of the court
of appeals in eleven cases. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, 75TH FISCAL YEAR ANN. REP.
OF THE NEW MEXICO JUD. BRANCH OF Gov'T 33 (1987).,
71. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-7 (Repl. Pamp. .1990) now provides that the headquarters of the
court of appeals, and the clerk's office shall be located at the seat of governmenti and that the
court may convene at any location in the state.
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remain in Santa Fe. 2 Satellite offices have several advantages. A certain
amount of day-to-day collegiality, however, is sacrificed.
As these or similar changes do occur, it will become more difficult
for the court of appeals to resist creating conflicting decisions,7 3 as other
jurisdictions have done. Continued devotion to the doctrine of stare
decisis will be required to ward off such conflicts.

72. Murphy, The New Mexico Court of Appeals Experiments with Satellite Offices, XVIV NEw
MExico TmAI. LAw. 153 (1991).
73. "[Tjhis court is now made up of' ten judges and the 'possibilities for inconsistent decisions
or decision by luck of the draw are now greatly expanded. Even when the court was smaller, there
were occasions when different panels of judges arrived at different legal conclusions, resulting in
instability in the law." State v. Bothne,. No. 13,425, slip op. at 2 (N.M. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1991)
(Pickard, J., specially concurring) (citations omitted).

